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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Patrick Lee O’Neil filed, pro se, a petition for post-conviction relief asserting some
claims that were untimely from the district court’s sentencing decision in his underlying criminal
case, and asserting other claims that were timely from the district court’s subsequent decision to
revoke his probation. After the State filed a motion for summary dismissal, the district court
denied Mr. O’Neil’s motion for appointment of counsel, finding Mr. O’Neil’s allegations are
frivolous because the district court determined all the claims are untimely.
On appeal, Mr. O’Neil asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for appointment of counsel. The district court did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards when it determined Mr. O’Neil’s allegations are frivolous for the reason that the
petition is untimely, because some of the issues in the petition are related to the probation
revocation and are therefore timely. Further, the petition alleges facts raising the possibility of a
valid claim.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, Bannock County No. CR 2015-16023, Mr. O’Neil
pleaded guilty to one count of felony delivery of methamphetamine, and one count of felony
delivery of heroin. (See R., pp.5, 86.) On August 16, 2016, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of twelve years, with five years fixed, on each count, to run concurrently. (See R., pp.5,
86 & n.4.) The district court then suspended the sentences and placed Mr. O’Neil on supervised
probation for a period of seven years. (R., p.86.) The district court also ordered Mr. O’Neil to
participate in and successfully complete the Bannock County Problem Solving Court, Wood
Court. (See R., pp.56, 86-87.) Mr. O’Neil did not appeal the judgment of conviction. (R., p.87.)
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Later, Mr. O’Neil was terminated from Wood Court, and the State alleged he had
violated his probation. (See R., p.87.) Mr. O’Neil subsequently admitted to violating his
probation. (See R., p.87.) On February 10, 2017, at a probation violation disposition hearing,
Mr. O’Neil again admitted to violating his probation. (See R., pp.87-88.) The district court
revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentences, as reflected in an order dated
February 17, 2017. (See R., pp.62-65, 88.) Mr. O’Neil filed an appeal of the district court’s
decision to revoke his probation. (R., p.88.)
On December 18, 2017, Mr. O’Neil filed, pro se, a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
and several affidavits in support. (R., pp.5-24.) Mr. O’Neil raised five issues in the petition:
(a) ineffective assistance of counsel by two of his attorneys; (b) “Raynee Myler perjured herself
multiple times, threatened me and was my neighbor”; (c) “prosecutor used false testimony that
he/she knew or had reason to believe was false”; (d) “my plea was induced by promises that
were not kept”; and (e) “police/prosecution withheld favorable information from the defense.”
(See R., p.6.) The affidavits and other supporting documents indicated Raynee Myler had been
Mr. O’Neil’s probation/parole officer. (See R., pp.7-14.) They also indicated Officer Myler and
Mr. O’Neil’s Wood Court therapist, Tazmin Cleaver, spoke at a hearing pertaining to the
probation revocation, considering the hearing happened after Mr. O’Neil’s termination from
Wood Court. (See R., pp.8-9, 13-15, 19-20.)
For ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. O’Neil asserted one attorney “hates me for
refusing to lie for his then client . . . .”; another attorney “promised me nothing more than a rider
would be argued for by prosecution”; “He promised me a full discovery even went as far to tell
me he put it on my property”; and “advised me P.O could be changed because she was my
neighbor.” (See R., p.23.)
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The State filed an Answer to Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief.
(R., pp.28-30.) The State also filed a Respondent’s Motion for Summary Dismissal, arguing
“Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are time-barred, fail to raise a genuine issue
of material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice,” and his “other
claims are bare and conclusory, unsubstantiated by fact, procedurally defaulted, or clearly
disproved by the record.” (R., pp.66-67.)
In its Respondent’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal (R., pp.31-40),
the State contended, “Petitioner’s claims and allegations are moot and should be procedurally
foreclosed as Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief is time barred. . . . Petitioner’s
claims should be dismissed in their entirety based on this issue alone” (R., p.38). The State also
argued: “Petitioner did not appeal the original sentence in this matter. Petitioner’s allegations
could have been raised on direct appeal and cannot be brought in the instant post-conviction
proceeding.” (R., p.39.) The State further argued, “Petitioner did not appeal the probation
revocation; however, an issue previously litigated on appeal cannot be re-litigated in a UPCPA
proceeding.” (R., p.39.) Additionally, the State contended: “Petitioner has not met his burden
[in] showing ineffective assistance of counsel by showing deficient performance and resulting
prejudice . . . . Petitioner’s allegations are not cognizable under the UPCPA and not supported
by any admissible evidence.” (R., p.39.)
Mr. O’Neil did not file a response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal. 1 He filed
a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel. (R., pp.75-79.)
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Mr. O’Neil did file, pro se, a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.71-74.) The Idaho Supreme Court
dismissed the appeal, because there was no appealable district court judgment at that time. (See
R., p.82.)
3

The district court then issued an Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
(R., pp.85-103.) Regarding the motion for appointment of counsel, the district court determined:
“Based on the analysis to follow, the allegations made by the Petitioner in this case are frivolous.
Indeed, the Petitioner did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a valid claim. Thus,
based on the governing standards and for the reasons stated herein, the appointment of counsel is
not required, and the Petitioner’s request is denied.” (R., p.91.)
In its following analysis of the petition itself, the district court characterized “[t]he central
issue raised in the petition” as “the alleged ineffective of counsel.” (R., p.92.) The district court
also recognized there were “other allegations seemingly in support of post-conviction relief,”
listing the issues regarding Officer Myler and the withholding of favorable evidence. (R., p.92.)
However, the district court did not specifically mention the false testimony issue Mr. O’Neil also
raised. (See R., p.92.)
On the timeliness of the petition, the district court determined, “Based on the entry date
of the judgment of conviction, the Petitioner had until September 27, 2016, to file an appeal of
his sentence, meaning he had until September 27, 2017, to initiate a request for post-conviction
relief.” (R., p.101.) However, “Mr. O’Neil did not file his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
until December 22, 2017, which was after his probation had been revoked and his sentence was
reinstated.”2 (R., p.101.) The district court then determined, “As such, the Petition for PostConviction Relief is time-barred, absent a basis to equitably toll the limitations period.”
(R., p.101.)

2

The date on the petition’s Certificate of Mailing is December 18, 2017 (see R., p.27), while the
date on the district court’s file stamp for the petition is December 22, 2017 (see R., p.5). Thus,
the record shows that Mr. O’Neil actually filed the petition on December 18, 2017. See
Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 643 (1996) (“We hold that the mailbox rule applies for purposes
of pro se inmates filing petitions for post-conviction relief.”).
4

The district court noted that “revocation of probation does not extent the time in which to
file a post-conviction petition attacking the underlying conviction,” and “a timely petition
challenging an order revoking probation may only raise issues related to such revocation.”
(R., p.101.) The district court determined, “The Petition in this case did not raise issues related
to the revocation of probation but only attacked the underlying conviction.” (R., p.101.)
According to the district court: “Mr. O’Neil made no argument to indicate a basis for
tolling the limitations period. Indeed, none of the claims raised by Mr. O’Neil can satisfy the test
for equitable tolling under the UPCPA.”

(R., pp.101-02.)

The district court therefore

determined, “as the failure to file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal where the petitioner
has not shown a reason for tolling the statute of limitations, this Court must dismiss Mr. O’Neil’s
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (R., p.102.) The district court subsequently issued a
Judgment dismissing with prejudice the post-conviction petition. (R., pp.123-24.)
Mr. O’Neil filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s order and
judgment dismissing the petition.

(R., pp.104-07; see R., pp.127-30 (Amended Notice

of Appeal).)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. O’Neil’s motion for appointment
of counsel, because some of the issues in the petition are related to the revocation of probation
and are therefore timely?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. O’Neil’s Motion For Appointment
Of Counsel, Because Some Of The Issues In The Petition Are Related To The Revocation Of
Probation And Are Therefore Timely

A.

Introduction
Mr. O’Neil asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for

appointment of counsel. The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards when it determined all of Mr. O’Neil’s claims are frivolous for the reason that the
petition for post-conviction relief is untimely, because some of the issues in the petition are
related to the revocation of probation and are therefore timely. Further, the petition alleges facts
raising the possibility of a valid claim. Thus, the district court should have granted the motion
for appointment of counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
“The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the

discretion of the district court.” Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). When
reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, an appellate court considers whether the
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). Further, “In reviewing the denial of a
motion for appointment of counsel in post conviction proceedings, ‘[t]his Court will not set aside
the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this
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Court exercises free review.” Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676, 678 (2001), superseded in part by statute as stated in Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793).
A post-conviction proceeding is civil is nature. Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299, 300
(2000). Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is the procedural equivalent
of summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and on review of a dismissal of a
post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions together with any affidavits on file, liberally construing inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Id.
Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides that, if a post-conviction “applicant is unable to pay court
costs and expenses of representation . . . a court-appointed attorney may be made available to the
applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal . . . .” I.C. § 194904. In Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court held, “For the purposes of I.C. § 19-4904, the
trial court should determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel and whether this is a
situation in which counsel should be appointed to assist the petitioner.” Charboneau, 140 Idaho
at 793. The Charboneau Court also held, “In doing that analysis, the trial court should keep in
mind the admonition set forth in Brown about the typical problems with pro se pleadings.” Id.
In Brown, the Idaho Supreme Court observed that a “trial court should keep in mind that
petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete.
Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, they also
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may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the essential
elements of the claim.” Brown, 135 Idaho at 679.3
The Charboneau Court held, “Therefore, in giving notice of intent to deny the Petition,
‘the court should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the
petitioner to supplement the request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist.’”
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). If the petitioner “alleges facts
to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give
the petitioner an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts.” Id.
“While clearly the standard permits the trial court to determine whether the facts alleged are such
that they justify the appointment of counsel, in determining whether to do so, every inference
must run in the petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts.” Id. at 793-94. The Court also
held, “At a minimum, the trial court must carefully consider the request for counsel, before
reaching a decision on the substantive merits of the petition and whether it contains new and
admissible evidence.” Id. at 794.
Later, the Idaho Supreme Court in Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007), applied the
standard announced in Charboneau to the question of whether a motion for appointment of
counsel should have been granted. Swader, 143 Idaho at 653. The Swader Court held, “In

3

The Brown Court had stated that “a needy applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to
court-appointed counsel unless the trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is
frivolous. Idaho Code § 19-852(b)(3) sets forth the standard for determining whether or not a
post-conviction proceeding is frivolous.” Brown, 135 Idaho at 679. The Charboneau Court
held, “Based upon our decision in Quinlan v. Idaho Comm’n for Pardons and Parole, [138 Idaho
726] (2003), it is clear that the standards imposed by I.C. § 19-852 are no longer applicable to
the court’s determination of entitlement to counsel in a post conviction proceeding.”
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.
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deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid claim, the trial court should
consider whether the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would
be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims.” Id. at 654.
“Although ‘the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the record
for possible nonfrivolous claims,’ the court should appoint counsel if the facts alleged raise the
possibility of a valid claim.” Id. (quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679).
The Swader Court also held: “When considering a motion for appointment of counsel,
the trial court must do more than determine whether the petition alleges a valid claim. The court
must also consider whether circumstances prevent the petitioner from making a more thorough
investigation into the facts.” Id. The Court noted that indigent, incarcerated defendants would
almost certainly be unable to conduct an investigation into facts outside the court record, and pro
se petitioners may similarly be unable to present sufficient facts showing ineffective assistance
of counsel. See id. at 654-55. A showing of ineffective assistance of counsel “will often require
the assistance of someone trained in the law.” See id. at 655.
Thus, the Swader Court held, “the trial court should appoint counsel if the petition alleges
facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person with adequate means
would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim.” Id. “The
investigation by counsel may not produce evidence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
But, the decision to appoint counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is
appointed are controlled by two different standards.”

Id.

The Idaho Court of Appeals

subsequently explained that “the threshold showing that is necessary in order to gain
appointment of counsel [is] considerably lower than that which is necessary to avoid summary
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dismissal of a petition.” Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Swader, 143
Idaho at 655; Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761 (Ct. App. 2006)).
The Judd Court additionally held, “an order that simultaneously dismisses a postconviction action and denies a motion for appointed counsel will be upheld on appeal if the
petitioner received notice of the fatal deficiencies of the petition and if, when the standard
governing a motion for appointment of counsel is correctly applied, the request for counsel
would properly be denied,” i.e., “when the petitioner did not allege facts raising even the
possibility of a valid claim.” Id. at 25 (citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529 (2007);
Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-55; Plant, 143 Idaho at 760-63; Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 49394 (Ct. App. 2004)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards When
It Determined Mr. O’Neil’s Allegations Are Frivolous For The Reason That The Petition
Is Untimely
Here, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards when it

determined Mr. O’Neil’s allegations are frivolous for the reason that the petition is untimely,
because some of the claims are related to the revocation of probation and are therefore timely.
The district court’s determination that “[t]he Petition in this case did not raise issues related to
the revocation of probation but only attacked the underlying conviction” (see R., p.101), as a
factual determination, is clearly erroneous. Some of the issues raised in Mr. O’Neil’s petition
actually relate to the revocation of probation, not the original conviction and sentencing. Thus,
the petition is not untimely with respect to those claims.
On the motion for appointment of counsel, the district court determined: “Based on the
analysis to follow, the allegations made by the Petitioner in this case are frivolous. Indeed, the
Petitioner did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a valid claim. Thus, based on the
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governing standards and for the reasons stated herein, the appointment of counsel is not required,
and the Petitioner’s request is denied.” (R., p.91.)
In the analysis relied upon to deny the appointment of counsel, the district court
determined that Mr. O’Neil had been sentenced in the underlying criminal case on August 16,
2016, and the record showed no appeal was filed. (See R., pp.100-01.) Thus, the district court
determined Mr. O’Neil had until September 27, 2017, to file a petition for post-conviction relief
from his conviction and sentence. (See R., p.101.) However, “Mr. O’Neil did not file his
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief until December 22, 2017, which was after his probation had
been revoked and his sentence was reinstated.” (R., p.101.)
The district court noted revocation of probation does not extend the time in which the file
a post-conviction petition from the original conviction, and a timely petition challenging an order
revoking probation may only raise issues related to such revocation. (R., p.101 & n.88 (citing
Gonzalez v. State, 139 Idaho 384, 386 (Ct. App. 2003); see R., p.99 & n.77 (quoting Martinez v.
State, 130 Idaho 530, 533-34 (Ct. App. 1997).) The district court then determined: “The
Petition in this case did not raise issues related to the revocation of probation but only attacked
the underlying conviction.” (R., p.101.) Thus, the district court determined, “as the failure to
file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal where the petitioner has not shown a reason for
tolling the statute of limitations, this Court must dismiss Mr. O’Neil’s Petition for PostConviction Relief.” (R., p.102.)
In other words, the district court decided the allegations in the petition are frivolous
because all the claims are untimely. However, claims in the petition related to the probation
revocation would be timely.
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The district court’s order revoking probation was filed on February 17, 2017. (See
R., p.62.) Mr. O’Neil filed an appeal of the district court’s probation revocation decision.4 (See
R., p.88.) An application for post-conviction relief “may be filed at any time within one (1) year
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.” I.C. § 19-4902(a).
Mr. O’Neil filed his petition on December 18, 2017, within that one-year period with respect to
the probation revocation (see R., p.25), and thus any claims in in the petition related to the
probation revocation would be timely.
Contrary to the district court’s determination, some of the issues raised in the petition
actually relate to the revocation of probation, and are therefore timely. The district court
summarily dismissed Mr. O’Neil’s petition not for lack of substantive merit, but because it was
untimely. (See R., pp.101-02.) Consequently, whether Mr. O’Neil has shown a possibility of a
valid claim, and thus reversible error in the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment
of counsel, turns upon whether his petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a timely
claim. See Judd, 48 Idaho at 25. Put otherwise, the district court committed reversible error if
the petition raised cognizable claims related to the probation revocation.

1.

Some Of The Issues Raised In The Petition Relate To The Probation Revocation
And Are Therefore Timely

Some of the issues raised in the petition relate to the probation revocation and are
therefore timely. For example, Mr. O’Neil asserted in the petition that “Raynee Myler perjured

4

While the district court did not discuss the outcome of the appeal (see R., p.87), the Idaho Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order revoking probation in an unpublished opinion on
November 8, 2017. State v. O’Neil, No. 44862, 2017 Unpublished Opinion No. 640 (Idaho
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2017).
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herself multiple times, threatened me and was my neighbor.” (R., p.6.) In an affidavit in support
of that claim, Mr. O’Neil averred, “P.O Myler claimed in incident report sent to Parole Board,
prosecutor and Judge (pg.1) that I was convicted of drug trafficking on Aug. 15, 2016 and I
never was.” (R., p.7.) He also asserted, Officer Myler “claims a Parole Violation was filed
Dec. 10, 2015 for my continued drug use however I had no accusation of use up to that time, no
dirty tests either.” (See R., p.7.)
The record shows the issue regarding Officer Myler relates to the probation revocation,
and not the original conviction and sentencing, because the report of parole violation Mr. O’Neil
cited is dated December 3, 2016, well after Mr. O’Neil’s sentencing date of August 16, 2016.5
(See R., pp.10, 100.)
Further, in an affidavit in support of the issue regarding Officer Myler, Mr. O’Neil
averred Officer Myler “perjured herself multiple times in written and verbal form to gain favor
from the court and parole board.” (R., p.8.) He also asserted Officer Myler contacted his
treatment facility about having the facility UA him, and he failed one of the four administered
tests. (See R., p.8.) The report of parole violation indicates Mr. O’Neil failed substance abuse
tests after he was placed on probation in the underlying criminal case, thus also showing the
issue regarding Officer Myler relates to the probation revocation. (See R., p.11.)
Additionally, in contrast to Officer Myler’s comments about setting up many
appointments for him to get his Social Security, Mr. O’Neil asserted in another affidavit that the
officer only set up one appointment, which was premature. (See R., p.13.) This affidavit

5

The report of parole violation is not from the underlying criminal case, but from Bannock
County CR 2010-8786, a grand theft by possession of stolen property case where Mr. O’Neil had
been on parole at the time he committed the offenses in the underlying criminal case. (See
R., pp.10-12.)
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likewise shows the issue regarding Officer Myler relates to the probation revocation, because the
cited transcript excerpt demonstrates Officer Myler made her comments after the testimony of
Mr. O’Neil’s counselor, one Ms. Cleaver. (See R., p.15 (Pet. Ex. 1, p.39, Ls.13-23).) In his
affidavit in support of the false testimony issue, Mr. O’Neil averred, “Tazmin Cleaver was my
Wood Court appointed therapist,” who “spoke at length without any objection from the
state . . . .” (See R., p.19.) The transcript excerpt therefore indicates the hearing pertained to
Mr. O’Neil’s probation violation disposition. (See also R., pp.62-63 (State’s Ex. G, the district
court’s order revoking probation, stating Officer Myler gave comments and Ms. Cleaver testified
at the February 10, 2017, probation violation disposition hearing).)
Thus, alongside the report of parole violation indicating Mr. O’Neil was admitted to
Wood Court “on his new convictions” in the underlying criminal case (see R., p.11), the affidavit
and related transcript excerpt further demonstrate the issue regarding Officer Myler relates to the
probation revocation, not to the original conviction and sentencing. Indeed, the district court
acknowledged in its findings of fact that Mr. O’Neil was ordered to complete the Bannock
County Problem Solving Court (i.e., Wood Court), as part of his original sentencing in the
underlying criminal case. (See R., pp.86-87; see also R., p.56 (State’s Ex. E, a December 3,
2016 report of probation violation stating Mr. O’Neil “was terminated from the Bannock County
Problem Solving Court, Wood Court for failure to comply with program standards”).) The issue
regarding Officer Myler relates to the probation revocation.
Mr. O’Neil also asserted in the petition that the “prosecutor used false testimony that
he/she knew or had reason to believe was false.” (R., p.6.) In the affidavit in support of that
claim, Mr. O’Neil asserted the “Prosecutor used false testimony that he/she knew or had reason
to believe was false. (by allowing Myler to say whatever she felt instead of what she knew).”
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(R., p.19.) This affidavit further discussed Ms. Cleaver’s testimony on Mr. O’Neil’s experiences
in Wood Court. (See R., pp.19-20.) Additionally, Mr. O’Neil averred: “Myler spoke of having
free clinic as a Wood Court provider, she and prosecution both knew upon my entry into
program there was only talk of exclusive provider. So I was left with no help but later received 2
of 5 meds from free clinic as that was all they would do for me.” (R., p.20.) The affidavit’s
assertions on Mr. O’Neil’s experiences in Wood Court, as well as on Officer Myler’s comments
and Ms. Cleaver’s testimony pertaining to Wood Court, show the false testimony issue relates to
the probation revocation.
Moreover, Mr. O’Neil asserted in the petition that the “police/prosecution withheld
favorable information from the defense.” (R., p.6.) This issue relates in part to the revocation of
probation, as suggested by the affidavit in support of the claim. In that affidavit, Mr. O’Neil
averred, “prosecution withheld fact that upon my entry into program there was no exclusive
medical provider for participants and when there was talk of it in the first place spoke of (before
free clinic) failed to make successful agreement with Wood Court.” (R., p.21.) The affidavit’s
statement on Wood Court shows the withholding favorable information issue also, in part, relates
to the probation revocation.
In sum, the record shows at least three of the five issues raised in Mr. O’Neil’s petition
actually relate to the revocation of probation, not the original conviction and sentencing. Thus,
the district court’s determination that “[t]he Petition in this case did not raise issues related to the
revocation of probation but only attacked the underlying conviction,” as a factual determination,
was clearly erroneous. (See R., p.101.) The issues raised in the petition relating to the probation
revocation are timely. See I.C. § 19-4902(a).
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2.

The Petition Alleges Facts Raising the Possibility Of A Valid Claim

Not only are some of the issues in Mr. O’Neil petition timely because they relate to the
revocation of probation, but also the petition alleges facts raising the possibility of a valid claim.
As discussed above, “an order that simultaneously dismisses a post-conviction action and denies
a motion for appointed counsel will be upheld on appeal if the petitioner received notice of the
fatal deficiencies of the petition and if, when the standard governing a motion for appointment of
counsel is correctly applied, the request for counsel would properly be denied,” i.e., “when the
petitioner did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a valid claim.” Judd, 148 Idaho at
25. “In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid claim, the trial court
should consider whether the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means
would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims.” Swader,
143 Idaho at 654.
The Court of Appeals in Judd emphasized that “the threshold showing that is necessary in
order to gain appointment of counsel [is] considerably lower than that which is necessary to
avoid summary dismissal of a petition.” Judd, 148 Idaho at 24. Mr. O’Neil’s petition meets that
threshold showing. With respect to the issue regarding Officer Myler, the affidavits in support of
the issue suggest Officer Myler provided comments at odds with Ms. Cleaver’s testimony and
Mr. O’Neil’s own experiences, indicating Officer Myler might have been lying. (See R., pp.7-9,
13-14.) Mr. O’Neil also provided information that Officer Myler might have been biased against
him, thanks to carrying a resentment against him from when they were neighbors. (See R., p.8.)
On the issues of false testimony and withholding favorable information, Mr. O’Neil’s
petition and the supporting affidavits supplied information that there was no exclusive medical
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provider for Wood Court, and he was not appropriately medicated in most of his time in Wood
Court. (See R., pp.19-21.)
Further, even if those issues are not possibly valid for reasons unrelated to their
timeliness, the petition and supporting affidavits nonetheless allege facts raising the possibility of
a valid claim that counsel was ineffective for not addressing Officer Myler’s lies during her
comments or her bias against Mr. O’Neil, or for not addressing the prosecution’s use of false
testimony or withholding of favorable information. For example, it is possible that counsel was
deficient for not challenging the falsehoods in Officer Myler’s comments, and that deficiency
influenced the district court’s decision to revoke probation. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). A reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to
conduct a further investigation into such a claim. See Swader, 143 Idaho at 654.
Even though Mr. O’Neil did not raise those particular ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in his petition, he may not have raised them because he, as a pro se petitioner without
legal training, was unable to properly articulate those claims. See Swader, 143 Idaho 651, 65354; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93. On remand, Mr. O’Neil could have the assistance of
appointed counsel in pursuing such potentially valid ineffective assistance of counsel issues. See
Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 257 (Ct. App. 2010) (“On appeal, this Court concluded that the
district court erred in denying Esquivel’s request for appointment of counsel to assist him in
pursuing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in regard to his PSE because he alleged facts
which raised the possibility of a valid claim. . . . On remand, the district court appointed counsel
who filed an amended post-conviction petition alleging, for the first time, ineffective assistance
of counsel on the basis that Esquivel’s trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to
advise Esquivel regarding his Fifth Amendment rights in submitting a PSE . . . .”). Thus,

18

Mr. O’Neil’s petition alleges facts raising the possibility of a valid claim, meeting the
“considerably lower” threshold to gain the appointment of counsel. See Judd, 148 Idaho at 24.
Some of the issues raised in Mr. O’Neil’s petition actually relate to the revocation of
probation, not the original conviction and sentencing, and are therefore timely. Mr. O’Neil’s
petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim. Thus, the district court did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards when it determined Mr. O’Neil’s allegations are
frivolous because the petition was untimely. The district court therefore abused its discretion
when it denied Mr. O’Neil’s motion for appointment of counsel. See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at
863; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 (2004).

Put otherwise, the district court committed

reversible error, because the petition raised cognizable claims related to the probation revocation.
See Judd, 48 Idaho at 25. The order and judgment summarily dismissing Mr. O’Neil’s petition
for post-conviction relief should be vacated, and the order denying his motion for appointment of
counsel should be reversed. See Swader, 143 Idaho at 655.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. O’Neil respectfully requests the Court vacate the order and
judgment summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, reverse the order denying
his motion for appointment of counsel, and remand the case to the district court for entry of an
order appointing counsel to assist Mr. O’Neil in further post-conviction proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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